by Roger L. Plunk

(Published by The Source, a Iowa monthly, October 1, 2001)

The September eleventh attack on America "changed the world." The Bush administration, which began its first months in office acting alone in the international community (remember the Kyoto treaty), suddenly begun a massive effort to work with the international community. U. S. policy makers became increasingly aware of how important it was to develop good working relations with the rest of the world. The health of the world depends on it. This new global unity has been created by the common enemy of terrorism. But it has also been created by the common experience of compassion for those who have suffered. The day after the attack, the many peoples of the world came together in silence and prayer for the victims of the attack. This was a moment of reflection on our spiritual roots. It is perhaps the most revealing aspect of the changed world.

The "war against terrorism," if it is to succeed, must be waged on two fronts. The first is the obvious military and policing action. The second is a public relations campaign to transform the thinking of militant fundamentalists from hate and violence, to tolerance and understanding. We need both. Without policing, we cannot stop the violence that is being planned at this moment. But without a public relations campaign, we can never hope to put an end to terrorism.

A part of this public relations campaign is for America to change its foreign policy so that it does not fuel the fires of animosity in Islamic countries. Hatred against America is a fertile field for terrorism to live and grow. Without it, terrorism will die. Fifty years of conflict between Israel and the Arab world has created generations of hate against Israel. Because the United States has always been seen by the Islamic world as supporting Israel, this hate is directed to the United States. The Bush administration, in particular, has been seen to be overly supportive of Israel against the Palestinians. For example, Bush has met with the Prime Minister of Israel, but has never met with the Palestinian leader. This has to change. The U. S. must be the impartial mediator. If anything, the U. S. should be partial towards the weaker party, which are the Palestinians.

It is important that the U. S. work with the international community to push for a fair political solution to the Middle East problem. This means, essentially, promoting a Palestinian state, to be composed of the "occupied territories": the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and I would add, East Jerusalem (pre-1967 borders). The bulk of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank must be removed, and some sort of compensation or aid must be given to the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip. Finally an economic plan is needed to bring the Palestinians out of the severe poverty they have fallen into.

The next most important foreign policy issue for the Islamic world is the sanctions against Iraq. It has been estimated that one hundred thousand Iraqi children have died from lack of medicine and food due to the sanctions. This is insanity. The United States must review its priorities. The lives of children are more important than an easy way (sanctions) to contain Saddam.

Much of the war on terrorism will be waged by a global coordination of foreign ministries, intelligence services, and local police. It will be a global police action throughout the world to search out, arrest and prosecute people involved in terrorism. The only conventional warfare now being contemplated is against Afghanistan.

Between 1997 and 1998 I spent seven months in Afghanistan mediating between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan's civil war. The Taliban, I found, were dedicated to conquest and assimilation of the people of Afghanistan under their repressive fundamentalist ideology. Those who follow Star Trek, will see a close similarity between the Taliban and the "Borg," a race that assimilates all other races into its "collective". The Taliban provided little for me, as a mediator, to work with. So I spent most of my time negotiating a common policy among the members of the Northern Alliance. That agreement, signed by nine members of the Northern Alliance, declared their dedication to a broad-based and democratic regime that would include all the ethnic and religious groups in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is called the "cross-roads of Asia." Alexander the Great, Ghengis Khan and the British all invaded Afghanistan. And for centuries, Afghanistan has been a route for merchants traveling between the orient and the west. As a cross-roads, Afghanistan is composed of a myriad of ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajic, Uzbek, Turkmen, Hazara (a Shia Muslim minoirty), and various other smaller ones. These groups correlate with the countries that surround Afghanistan: Pakistan, which has a large population of Pashtun; Iran, which shares the Muslim Shia beliefs of the Hazara; and of course, Tajikstan Uzbeckistan and Turkmenistan.

The Taliban leaders are all Pashtun, from a small minority of the Pashtun population. Thus they do not even represent the whole population of Pashtuns. In contrast, the Northern Alliance, which still holds the United Nations seat for Afghanistan, has leaders from all the ethnic groups. It is an inclusive group that seeks to unify all the diverse ethnic and religious groups.

In 1998, the day after the bombings of the United States embassies in Africa, I contacted the State Department's Afghan Affairs to encourage them to put their support behind Afghanistan's Northern Alliance (at the time, they had a neutral position). I did this again after the Bush administration came into office. The Northern Alliance, I argued, was America's natural friend and ally in promoting democracy and human rights, and combating the Taliban and their safe haven for terrorists and militant fundamentalists that are trained for export to Kashmir, China, Central Asia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Europe, and, of course, the United States. It was not that I was insightful about the dangers of terrorism. This was common knowledge. Besides, the earlier bombings of the World Trade Center, U. S. embassies and the U. S. Cole was clear evidence. There simply was not the political will in the U. S. government to act.

One reason for America's lack of political will-power is that Pakistan was considered a "friend" (originally as an ally against the Soviet Union), and Pakistan supported the Taliban. The Taliban is the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan has a long-standing policy of supporting the formation of a Pashtun dominated regime in Afghanistan. The reason is that there are many Pashtuns in Pakistan, and a Pashtun government in Afghanistan would create a type of ethnic alliance.

One third of the Taliban's army is Pakistani, all trained in militant fundamentalism in pseudo Islamic schools inside Pakistan. Many of the terrorists trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan go to Kashmir to fight against Indian troops protecting Indian Kashmir (Kashmir is divided between Indian and Pakistani controlled areas). And it was Pakistan that arranged for bin Laden to come to Afghanistan, after so many other countries refused to have him. Thus, Pakistan itself is a source of terrorists. The reason why the U. S. did has not put Pakistan on its official list of terrorist countries, according to former Secretary of State Albright, is that Pakistan is "our friend."

The United States is partly at fault for the current situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the ten years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989, America channeled about three billion dollars of military aid to Afghan "freedom fighters." This money was given to Pakistan, which gave all the resources to fundamentalists instead of moderates. They thus created an army of militant fundamentalists. It was a monster that could easily turn on its maker. The U. S. sat by idly as this happened. The U. S. also sat by idly, after the Soviets left Afghanistan, and watched as Pakistan created the Taliban. The U. S. ignored its higher moral responsibility to safeguard peace, democracy and basic human rights. The blind forces of realpolitik overshadowed moralpolitik.

The September eleventh attack on the United States has changed the political landscape in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has to support the world community to survive as a nation. But in so doing, it has to turn against the Taliban and the militant fundamentalism in its own country. Pakistan is like a man with a mean pit-bull that is devoted to him, but must be put to sleep because it keeps biting people. Pakistan is now being forced to reject its militant fundamentalists and their organizations. Thus we find Pakistan in Turmoil, in transformation, struggling to overcome its "dark side" of militant fundamentalism.

The United States has asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden and his associates. The problem with this request is that bin Laden is far too powerful for the Taliban to arrest him and hand him over. Bin Laden is sometimes called the "de-facto defense minister of the Taliban" because he provides the Taliban army with funding and other resources. He has his own small army of thousands of non-Afghan Arabs, who are perhaps the strongest fighters in the Taliban army. All the Taliban can possibly do is ask bin Laden to leave Afghanistan, and they have done this. There is thus very little chance that the U. S. can arrest bin Laden without fighting the Taliban's army.

As a mediator, I will not say there is no chance. There is always a possibility for a less violent solution. But it is very slim. For example, in the face of destruction by a multinational military force, the Taliban could be convinced to have a cease-fire with the Northern Alliance, and to withdraw their forces from the capital, Kabul. This would be followed by a "grand assembly" of Afghans in Kabul, under the leadership of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, to elect a new government of Afghanistan. During this time, a multi-national force could be allowed to search out bin Laden and his small army.

In the event of the looming conflict with the Taliban, the Northern Alliance is America's natural ally. We share the same political values and goals. And we share the same enemy. It is bin Laden who is suspected of assassinating Ahmed Shah Masood, the chief military commander of the Northern Alliance (and a personal friend), just two days before the attack on the United States. The Northern Alliance knows Afghanistan's terrain and its people. They know where the millions of land mines are, and the many hiding places that bin Laden's small army may go. And they know how to fight the Taliban.

In a United States military alliance with the Northern Alliance, the Northern Alliance could do most of the ground fighting, supported by U. S. air support and intelligence. This would vastly reduce, if not eliminate, U. S. casualties. The Taliban, with no popular support, would topple quickly. And the U. S., supporting an Islamic army, would not be viewed as an "oppressor" of Islam. With a friendly democratic regime established in Afghanistan, terrorism will not be able to sprout there again in the future.

Most important is that the United States be an ally to the Northern Alliance in peace-building as well as in war. Not as an occupying power, but as a needed friend and adviser. Bush has recently stated that America is not into "nation building." But he is wrong. America rebuilt Japan and Germany after the Second World War. And since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt, it has been America's stated policy to promote democracy and human rights throughout the world.

After ten years of war with the Soviets, followed by about twelve years of civil war, Afghanistan's political and social institutions have been destroyed. Afghans have nothing left to build from. The new Afghan regime will be faced with building democratic and human rights-based institutions from the bottom up. After United States military action must come the peace action: action to safe-guard the virtues of peace, democracy and human rights.

When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, so did American interest. America failed to follow up in Afghanistan to ensure the development of a stable democratic regime. Many Afghans told me they felt betrayed by this. After all, they helped the United States defeat a common enemy. The Northern Alliance is now faced with helping the United States defeat another common enemy, the greatest enemy the U. S. has had since the Soviets. The United States should not betray them again.

Roger L. Plunk is an international mediator, and author of The Wandering Peacemaker.